The number of known vulnerabilities in computer software is increasing exponentially. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG)† has posited that we need to enforce hardware and software security in order to restore trust in computer software. But trusted by whom and in what way?
- Is it trusted by the user to keep their files and email private?
- Or is it trusted by the user’s company to keep their data secure?
- Maybe it’s trusted by the OS vendor to be running only legally purchased software?
- Or do they mean trusted by the RIAA and MPAA not to play any copyrighted works, even in violation of fair use policy?
Unfortunately with names like Sony and Microsoft on the contributor list the TCG has been accused of paying more attention to the latter than the former (and perhaps rightly so). The TCG neatly avoids the issue by not bothering to define what they mean by “trusted computing.” The result? The introduction of trusted computing hardware (such as the TPM chip in the new Intel Macs) is seen as a step backwards for consumer rights, the worst thing to happen since DVD region codes and the MPAA/RIAA lawsuits.
But that ignores the fact that there is a real problem to be solved here (whether or not you believe the TCG are the right ones to do it): computers today cannot be trusted. As much as I would like to, I simply cannot trust my computer to
- keep my files secure from unuauthorized access;
- keep my hardware secure from unauthorized use;
- keep my communications private;
- only run code I trust;
- hide my identity and activities online;
- always work reliably; or failing that,
- keep an up-to-the-minute, versioned history of settings, data, and running processes.
Open source and consumer rights activists are probably justified in rejecting the TCG’s solution for trusted computing. But please don’t reject the idea of trusted computing! If anything, this is the moment for open source developers to step up and create an alternate model of trust. One which respects the rights of the consumer and the need for privacy. Otherwise, 5 years down the line we may wake up to discover a hostile Trusted Computing Platform so well entrenched that there will be no going back.
† As an aside, I find it funny that the TCG page sends you to an SSL hosted page by default. It’s as if that is supposed to somehow assure me of their ability to define security standards. In fact, if you look at the certificate (you did look at the certificate, didn’t you?) it isn’t even clear that the certificate used was granted to the TCG at all (who the heck is Kavi Corporation?). A real confidence booster there.